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The Essay examines the phenomenon of renegotiation of international project agreements,






Experienced lawyers and executives know that the challenge
of international project negotiations is not just "getting to yes,"1
but also staying there. Despite lengthy negotiations, skilled
drafting, and strict enforcement mechanisms, parties to sol-
emnly signed and sealed international project contracts often
find themselves returning to the bargaining table later on to "re-
negotiate" their agreements.
The last half century has witnessed numerous examples of
renegotiation in international business: the renegotiation of
mineral and petroleum agreements in the 1960s and 1970s,
often in the face of threatened host country nationalizations and
expropriations, 2 the loan "reschedulings" of the 1980s following
the debt crisis in many developing countries,3 and most recently
the "restructuring" of project agreements and financings re-
quired by the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s.4 The pat-
tern will certainly continue in the future. For example, the entry
of China into the World Trade Organization will prompt the re-
negotiation of countless international business contracts made
during that country's previous trade and investment regime.5
The renegotiation of business deals is a constant and com-
mon phenomenon of the international business environment.6
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In today's business world, executives, lawyers, and government
officials through renegotiation seem to be seeking continually
either to alleviate a bargain that has become onerous or to hold
on to a good deal that the other side wants to change. The ex-
amples are so numerous that renegotiation of a previous deal
seems to be as basic to modern business life as is negotiating a
new deal for the first time. In the new economy, which is charac-
terized by rapid change, renegotiation may become even more
pronounced as companies try to find ways to negotiate contracts
that provide stability, on the one hand, yet give the parties the
flexibility to face the unknown, on the other.
The purpose of this Essay is to examine the phenomenon of
renegotiation of international project agreements, to explore its
nature and causes, and to offer useful advice on how best to con-
duct the renegotiation process.
I. DEFINING RENEGOTIATION
Discussions of "renegotiation" apply the term to three fun-
damentally different situations, and it is therefore important to
distinguish them at the outset. Each raises different problems,
and each demands different solutions. The three situations are:
(1) post-deal renegotiations, (2) intra-deal renegotiations, and
(3) extra-deal renegotiations."
A. Post-Deal Renegotiations
Post-deal renegotiation refers to the situation in which ne-
gotiations take place at the expiration of a contract when the two
sides, though legally free to go their own ways, nonetheless try to
renew their relationship.' For example, a project company has
built an electrical generating station in an emerging market
country and has made a twenty-year electricity supply contract
with that country's state public utility corporation. At the end of
twenty years, when local law considers their legal relationship at
an end, the project company and the public utility corporation
begin discussions on a second long-term electricity supply con-
tract, thereby "renegotiating" their original relationship. While
TIVE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT NEGOTIATING ABROAD 147-63 (1991) [hereinafter MAKING
GLOBAL DEALs].
7. See id. at 151-55.
8. This process is also sometimes referred to as "contract renewal."
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this second negotiation process-a post-deal renegotiation-
may seem at first glance to resemble the negotiation of their
original contract, it also has some notable differences, as will be
seen, that influence renegotiation strategies, tactics, and out-
comes.
B., Intra-Deal Renegotiations
A second type of renegotiation occurs when the agreement
itself provides that, during its life at specified times or on the
happening of specified events, the parties may renegotiate or re-
view certain of its provisions. For example, the twenty-year elec-
tricity supply contract mentioned above might include a provi-
sion calling for the renegotiation of the agreement's pricing
terms in the event of dramatic changes in fuel costs. Or in an
agreement between a manufacturer and a sales company for the
marketing of specific products, the contract may stipulate that if
the manufacturer develops new products it will agree to renego-
tiate its original deal with respect to the marketing of the new
products.' Here renegotiation is anticipated as a legitimate ac-
tivity in which both parties, while still bound to each other in a
valid contract, are to engage in good faith. It is an intra-deal
renegotiation because it takes places within the legal framework
established for the original transaction.
C. Extra-Deal Renegotiations
The most difficult, stressful, and emotional renegotiations
are those undertaken in apparent violation of the contract or at
least in the absence of a specific clause authorizing a renegoti-
ation. These negotiations take place "extra deal," for they occur
outside the framework of the existing agreement. Forced rene-
gotiation of mineral concession contracts of the 1960s and
1970s, negotiations to reschedule loans following the Third
World debt crisis of the early 1980s, and the restructuring of in-
frastructure and financial agreements in the wake of the Asian
financial crisis of the late 1990s all fit within the category of ex-
tra-deal renegotiations. In each case, one of the participants was
seeking relief from a legally binding obligation without any basis
for renegotiation in the agreement itself. For example, in the
9. See, e.g., Howtek, Inc. v. Relisys, et al., 958 F. Supp. 46 (D.N.H. 1997).
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illustration given above, if the state public utility company, with-
out justification in the contract, had insisted on negotiations to
reduce the price it was committed to pay for electricity under the
contract, such discussions would be categorized as "extra-deal re-
negotiations," because they would be taking place outside of the
legal framework of the original contract.
D. Summary
All three types of renegotiation are a constant and ever-pre-
sent fact of international business life. All three differ signifi-
cantly from the situation in which two parties come together to
negotiate a deal in first instance. At the same time, each of these
three types of renegotiation differ among themselves with re-
spect to the dynamics between the parties, as well as the strate-
gies and tactics they may employ. The remainder of this Essay
will explore these three renegotiation processes in detail. It will
devote particular attention to extra-deal renegotiations because
they are a constant risk for an international project and can have
serious implications for project sponsors and financing institu-
tions. To illustrate the problems and dynamics of this kind of
renegotiation, this Essay will examine in some detail a specific
case of extra-deal project renegotiation-the renegotiation of
the Dabhol Power Project in India.
II. POST-DEAL NEGOTIATIONS
A. Distinguishing Factors
Although post-deal renegotiations take place when the orig-
inal transaction has reached or is approaching its end, several
factors distinguish it from a negotiation in first instance, factors
that may significantly affect the renegotiation process. First, by
virtue of local law, customs of the particular business concerned,
or the parties' express or implied contractual commitments to
one another, the parties may have a legal obligation to negotiate
in good faith with one another despite the fact that their original
contract has terminated; consequently, their ability to refuse to
engage in post-deal renegotiations may be limited. The exis-
tence and precise nature of such a duty will depend on the law
governing the contract.
English common law has traditionally recognized a broad,
unrestrained freedom of negotiation, which permits a party to
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begin or end negotiation at any time for any reason.' ° The ratio-
nale for this rule is that to limit the freedom to negotiate might
discourage persons from undertaking to make transactions in
the first place. Although the common law has traditionally up-
held the freedom to negotiate in commercial matters,11 the law
in certain other countries has taken a less liberal approach to
permissible behavior in business negotiations. 12 In such jurisdic-
tions, once the parties have commenced negotiations, they may
have an obligation to negotiate in good faith.
In the case of post-deal renegotiations, by reason of an ex-
press provision in the original contract itself, the prevailing prac-
tices and customs of the business concerned, or the conduct of
the parties toward one another, the parties at the termination of
their first contract may have an obligation to negotiate in good
faith a renewal of their relationship. In contrast, parties seeking
to negotiate a transaction in first instance would have no such
obligation and could abandon negotiations at any time.
The precise content of the obligation to negotiate in good
faith negotiations will vary from country to country. It may in-
clude a duty not to negotiate with a third person until post-deal
negotiations with a party in the original transaction have failed.
It may also impose an obligation not to terminate renegotiations
without reasonable cause and without having persevered for a
reasonable length of time.1" Failure by a party to fulfill its obli-
gations to renegotiate in good faith may result in liability in dam-
ages.
Even if the applicable law imposes no legal obligation to re-
negotiate in good faith, the original contract, as well as eco-
nomic factors, may constrain the renegotiation process in ways
not present in the original negotiations. For example, the
twenty-year electricity supply contract mentioned above might
provide that if the project company and the public utility com-
pany fail to successfully negotiate a second twenty-year supply
contract at the end of the first agreement, the public utility com-
pany will be obligated to purchase the project company's electri-
10. See E. Alan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 217, 221-22 (1987).
11. See id.
12. See generally Saul Litvinoff, Good Faith, 71 TUL. L. Rv. 1645, 1659-62 (1997).
13. See Farnsworth, supra note 10, at 269-85 (discussing the meaning of fair dealing
in negotiations and offering instances of unfair dealing).
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cal generating facility in accordance with a pricing formula spec-
ified in the original agreement.
In addition to the factors arising out of law and contract,
numerous other elements may influence post-deal renegotia-
tions. First, the parties in a post-deal renegotiation have a
shared experience of working together and a knowledge of each
other's goals, methods, intentions, capabilities, and reliability.
Obviously, the nature of their earlier experience together will
significantly affect their renegotiation. For example, the
problems of cross-cultural communication that may have compli-
cated their first negotiation will probably be far less important in
the second, since the parties, through working together, have
learned much about each other's cultures. Second, many of the
original questions about their venture-its risks and opportuni-
ties-have been answered and that information will shape bar-
gaining positions in the renegotiation.
Finally, the willingness of the participants to reach an agree-
ment will be influenced by their tangible and intangible invest-
ments in their first relationship and the extent to which they can
use those investments advantageously in their second contract.
For example, the project company in the illustration above will
have built the generating facility, organized itself, and trained its
employees to provide electricity over the long term to a single
specific purchaser, the state public utility. All other things being
equal, the project company may prefer to enter into a new con-
tract with the utility, rather than to make an agreement with an-
other purchaser, since the latter course of action would entail
significant new risks and costs. Similarly, the public utility hav-
ing come to rely on the project for a major portion of its supply
may wish to avoid the costs of finding another supplier or creat-
ing its own electrical generating capacity.
In any negotiation, a party's behavior at the negotiating ta-
ble is influenced by its evaluation of available alternatives to the
deal it is trying to negotiate. Rational negotiators will not ordi-
narily agree to a transaction that is inferior to its best alternative
to an agreement at the negotiating table.14 In a post-deal rene-
gotiation, each party's evaluation of its alternatives to a renegoti-
14. See FIsHER ET AL., supra note 1, at 99-102 (discussing the concept of BATNA,
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement).
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ated deal will be heavily influenced by the history of its relation-
ship with the other party during their first contract.
In general, the success of post-deal renegotiations will de-
pend on the nature of the relationship that has developed be-
tween the parties during the original contract. If that relation-
ship is strong and productive, the atmosphere at the bargaining
table will be that of two partners trying to solve a common prob-
lem. If the relationship is weak and problematic, the prevailing
mood will be that of two cautious adversaries who know each
other only too well.'
5
B. Some Principles to Guide Post-Deal Renegotiations
The factors discussed above give rise to the following princi-
ples that lawyers, executives, and government officials should
consider in structuring and conducting the process of post-deal
renegotiations.
1. Provide for Post-Deal Renegotiations in the
Original Contract
In project situations in which the desirability or likelihood
of post-deal renegotiations is high, the parties should specify in
their original contract the process and rules that they will follow
in conducting a post-deal renegotiation. For example, the con-
tract should state how soon before the end of the contract that
renegotiations are to begin, how long the renegotiations are to
continue before either party may legally abandon them, where
the renegotiations are to take place, and the nature of the infor-
mation that each side is to provide the other, among other mat-
ters. Recognizing that post-deal renegotiations may become
problematic, the contract might also authorize the use of
mediators or other third-party helpers in the process.16
15. See generally Jeswald W. Salacuse, After The Contract, What? Negotiating to Work
Successfully with a Foreign Partner, 2 CAN. INT'L LAw. 195-200 (1997).
16. SeeJeswald W. Salacuse, Direct Negotiation and Mediation in International Financial
and Business Conflicts, in NON-JUDICIAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 53-72 (N. Horn &J. Norton eds., 2000) [hereinafter Direct Negotiation and
Mediation]. See generally C. BUHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS (1996).
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2. Individually and Jointly Review the History of the
Relationship During the Original Contract
As part of its preparation, each party to a post-deal renegoti-
ation should review carefully and thoroughly the history of the
experience of working together during the first contract. An un-
derstanding of the problems encountered during that period
will enable each side to shape proposals to remedy the situation
during a contemplated second agreement. To make that review
an opportunity for creative problem-solving, rather than mutual
acrimony over past mistakes, the parties should structure a joint
review of past experience, perhaps with the help of a neutral
facilitator, at the beginning of the post-deal renegotiation pro-
cess. For example, as a first step in the renegotiation process,
the parties might agree to give a review team consisting of execu-
tives from each participating company the task of preparing a
mutually acceptable history of the project to be considered by
the negotiators as they begin their work on a new agreement.
Inevitably, during the course of post-deal renegotiations, each
side will refer to past events. The renegotiation process may pro-
ceed more smoothly and efficiently if, at the beginning of the
process, the parties have a common understanding of their his-
tory together, rather than engage in a continuing debate about
the existence and significance of past events throughout the re-
negotiation.
3. Understand Thoroughly the Alternatives to the Deal
Negotiation scholars stress the importance of negotiators
knowing their alternatives to the deal that they are trying to ne-
gotiate and estimating their counterparts' alternatives. 17 Gener-
ally, the better a negotiator's alternatives away from the negotiat-
ing table, the stronger the negotiator's position at the bargain-
ing table."8 In a post-deal renegotiation, these two tasks are
often complicated by the fact that the parties may have con-
ducted their business in such a way during the first contract that
few realistic alternatives to a second contract seem possible. For
example, the project company that owns a generating facility
17. See FISHER ET AL, supra note 1, at 99-102.
18. See, e.g., David Lax & James Sebenius, The Power of Alternatives or the Limits To
Negotiation, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 97-113 (J. Breslin & J. Rubin eds.,
1991).
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may feel that it has few other options than to enter into a second
contract with the state public utility. Or the public utility com-
pany in a country that has a severe energy shortage may see no
realistic alternatives to making a second electricity power
purchase agreement with the project company. Rather than ac-
cepting the inevitability of a second contract, each side, long
before the termination of the first contract, should carefully ex-
amine all options and seek to develop possible alternatives
before entering into post-deal renegotiations. For example, the
state public utility corporation, several years in advance of the
end of the first contract, should contact other potential project
companies to determine their interest in developing electrical
generation plants in the country.
III. INTRA-DEAL RENEGOTIATIONS
A. Balancing Contractual Stability and Flexibility
Due to the nature of projects themselves, project agree-
ments cover long time periods, usually many years, include sev-
eral parties, deal with highly complex technical and financial
matters, and involve large sums of money. As a result, all sides in
the negotiation process seek contractual stability. At the same
time, the parties know that during the long time period covered
by their agreement, many unforeseen political, economic, regu-
latory, and technical circumstances may arise to drastically
change the balance of benefits from the project that the parties
contemplated at the time that they signed the project agree-
ment. Consequently, one can argue that a certain degree of flex-
ibility is a second imperative that the project contracting process
should seek. To provide for that flexibility, mechanisms could
be included in the contract to allow the parties to adjust their
relationship to such changes in circumstances.
One approach to balancing the imperatives of stability and
flexibility in project agreements is for the contract itself to au-
thorize the parties to renegotiate key elements of their relation-
ship upon the happening of specified events or circumstances.
The inclusion in the contract of some type of intra-deal renegoti-
ation clause would appear to be a wise basis for establishing a
long-term business relationship. Although commentators have
advocated specific renegotiation or revision clauses in long-term
international business agreements, these provisions have tradi-
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tionally been rarely used. l" Indeed prevailing contracting prac-
tice among western firms and lawyers is just the opposite. Their
preferred approach is to try to anticipate all possible future con-
tingencies and to provide for them in the contract document,
while seeking to foreclose any possibility of renegotiating its
terms at a later date.
The traditional reluctance to use renegotiation clauses
stems from a variety of factors, both legal and practical. First is
the concern among lawyers that renegotiation clauses are merely
"agreements to agree" and, therefore, may be invalid and unen-
forceable under the law of many countries. 21 Judicial precedent
on the validity of renegotiation clauses is sparse, so guidance in
this area comes almost exclusively from judicial doctrine with re-
spect to contract renewal and preliminary agreements.2 1 Unlike
the English common law, which has tended to dismiss agree-
ments to negotiate as unenforceable, the contemporary ap-
proach in many American jurisdictions is to hold that agree-
ments to negotiate in good faith are not unenforceable as a mat-
ter of law.2 2 According to one recent case from a U.S. Federal
District Court, "the critical inquiry in evaluating the enforceabil-
ity of an express or implied agreement to negotiate in good faith
is whether the standard against which the parties' good-faith ne-
gotiations are to be measured is sufficiently certain to comport
with the applicable body of contract law."'23 A specific renegoti-
ation clause in an existing contract with definite terms as to how
the parties are to conduct the renegotiation process would easily
meet this standard of enforceability. The required certainty
would be further satisfied by specifying the precise events that
give rise to the obligation to renegotiate and by specifically pro-
viding for the timing, locale, and conditions of the renegotiation
process, among others.
Practical considerations have led western lawyers and execu-
tives to view renegotiation clauses with suspicion on the grounds
19. M. BARTELS, CONTRACTUAL ADAPTATION AND CONFLICr RESOLUTION 65 (James
E. Silva trans., 1985); see also Kolo & Walde, supra note 2, at 43.
20. See, e.g., J. W. Carter, The Renegotiation of Contracts, 13J. CONTRACT L. 185, 188
(1999).
21. See generally Farnsworth, supra note 10.
22. See Howtek, Inc. v. Relisys, et. al., 958 F. Supp. 46 (D.N.H. 1996); Channel
Home Ctr. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291, 299 (3d Cir. 1986).
23. See Howtek, 958 F. Supp at 48.
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that they increase uncertainty and risk in business transactions
and offend western concepts of the sanctity of the contract.
24
Their presence in a contract also creates a risk that one of the
parties will use a renegotiation clause as a lever to force changes
in provisions that, strictly speaking, are not open to revision.
Moreover the challenge of drafting these provisions and the
heightened risks to contractual stability by renegotiation provi-
sions that have yet to be tested in the courts are additional fac-
tors that have deterred lawyers from using them in long-term
business contracts.25
Despite these potential pitfalls, the inclusion of a renegoti-
ation clause may actually contribute to transactional stability in
certain situations. First, in cases in which significant changes in
circumstances may result in severe unexpected financial hard-
ship, a renegotiation clause may permit the parties to avoid de-
fault, with the attendant risk of litigation and extra-deal renego-
tiations. At the outset, the parties should recognize the risk of
changed circumstances and create within the contract a process
to deal with them, rather than to try to predict all eventualities
and leave the matter up to the courts or arbitrators when those
predictions prove to be flawed.
A second situation in which a renegotiation clause may be
helpful occurs in cases in which the parties, by virtue of their
differing cultures, understand and perceive the basis of a busi-
ness transaction in fundamentally different ways. For example,
western notions of business transactions as being founded upon
law and contract often clash with conceptions in other cultures
that hold that business dealings are fundamentally based on the
relationship between the parties involved.2 6 In many Asian
countries, in particular, business executives consider the essence
of a business deal to be the relationship between the parties,
rather than the written contract which can only describe that re-
24. See W. A. STOEVER, RENEGOTIATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
27 (1981).
25. See, e.g., NAGLA NASSAR, SANCTITV OF CONTRACTS REVISITED 205-30 (1995);
Carter, supra note 20, at 189; K. M. Sharma, From "Sanctity" to "Fairness": An Uneasy
Transition in the Law of Contracts, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 95, 132-42 (1999).
26. See PhilipJ. McConnaughay, Rethinking the Role of Law and Contracts in East-West
Commercial Relations, VA.J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2001); see alsoJeswald W. Salacuse, Ten
Ways That Culture Affects Negotiation, 14 NEG. J. 221, 225-27 (1998) [hereinafter Ten
Ways]; LUCIAN PYE, CHINESE NEGOTIATING STYLE (1982).
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lationship imperfectly and incompletely.27 Often persons from
those cultures assume that any long-term business relationship
includes an implicit, fundamental principle: in times of change,
parties in a business relationship should meet to decide together
how to cope with that change and adjust their relationship ac-
cordingly.
In long-term business transactions between a western and
an Asian firm, the western party may view the transaction as set
in the concrete of a lengthy and detailed contract, without the
possibility of modification, while the eastern party may see the
transaction as floating on fluid personal and social relationships
between the parties that contain an implicit commitment to re-
negotiate the terms of the transaction in the event of unforseen
happenings. In a long-term transaction, such as a joint venture
project between eastern and western companies whose success
depends on close and continuing cooperation, it may be wise to
recognize this difference of view at the time of negotiation and
attempt to find some middle ground.
A renegotiation clause may represent such middle ground
between total contractual rigidity, on the one hand, and com-
plete relational flexibility, on the other. Thus, rather than dis-
miss the possibility of renegotiation and then be forced at a later
time to review the entire contract, project partners who want to
enable their business relationship to weather difficult seas
should recognize the possibility of renegotiation at the outset of
their dealings with one another and should set down a clear
framework within which to conduct that process. Through a re-
negotiation clause, the parties recognize the possibility of re-
doing their deal, but control the renegotiation process. An in-
tra-deal renegotiation clause, then, may give stability to an ar-
rangement whose long-term nature creates a high risk of
instability.
B. Approaches to Intra-Deal Renegotiation
In recent times, the use of renegotiation clauses seems to
27. See Ten Ways, supra note 26, at 222 (surveying over 300 executives and lawyers
from 12 nationalities and finding significant differences among nationalities on
whether they viewed goal of negotiation as creating contract or creating relationship).
Whereas 74% of the Spanish respondents viewed the goal of a negotiation as conclud-
ing a contract (instead of creating a relationship), 67% of the Indians claimed that a
relationship, rather than a contract, was their negotiating goal. Id.
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have become somewhat more frequent as a means of dealing
with the problem of unpredictable future changes in circum-
stances in long-term agreements. 28 A review of possible ap-
proaches to intra-deal renegotiation clauses may be useful to ex-
ecutives, lawyers, and government officials involved in project
contracting.
1. The Implicit Minor Renegotiation Clause
Persons responsible for project implementation know that
despite some lawyers' claims to the contrary, project agreements,
no matter how detailed, are not a kind of automatic, compre-
hensive instruction booklet that the parties follow blindly. Time
and again, executives involved in the actual implementation of
international projects have given the author the same message:
"Once the contract is signed, we put it in the drawer. After that,
what matters most is the relationship between us and our part-
ner, and we are negotiating that relationship all the time." At
best, such contracts are frameworks within which the parties con-
stantly negotiate their relationship.29 What this view means in
practice is that certain matters in the transaction, usually but not
always of a minor nature, are subject to renegotiation by the par-
ties as part of the on-going relationship, despite the fact that
their contract contains no specific renegotiation clause.3° One
can therefore argue that an "implicit minor renegotiation
clause" is part of the project agreement. For example, if the
electrical supply agreement in the example above provides that
the project is to commence delivery of electricity on June 1,
2002, but it later becomes apparent that a four-day national re-
ligious holiday falls on that date, making it difficult for the pub-
28. See Carter, supra note 20, at 189.
29. See Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L. J.
704, 736-37 (1931). Sixty years ago, Karl Llewellyn made the same point when he wrote:
To sum up, the major importance of a legal contract is to provide a frame-
work for well-nigh every type of group organization and for well-nigh every
type of passing or permanent relation between individuals and groups, up to
and including states-a frame-work highly adjustable, a frame-work which al-
most never accurately indicates real working relations, but which affords a
rough indication around which such relations vary, an occasional guide in
cases of doubt, and a norm of final appeal when the relations cease in fact to
work.
Id.
30. See Kolo & Walde, supra note 2, at 45.
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lic utility to accept delivery, the parties would renegotiate a more
appropriate time for delivery.
2. Review Clauses
Long-term contracts, particularly in the oil and mineral in-
dustries, sometimes commit the parties to meet to review the op-
eration of their agreement from time to time. 1 Thus, one min-
ing agreement provided that the parties were to meet together
every seven years "with a view to considering in good faith
whether this Agreement is continuing to operate fairly to each of
them and with a view further to discussing in good faith any
problems arising from the practical operation of this agree-
ment. '3 2 Although the words "negotiation" or "renegotiation"
are not used in the clause, one reasonable interpretation is that
it carries an implicit obligation for the parties to negotiate solu-
tions to problems in good faith.
3. Automatic Adjustment Clauses
Project agreements often contain certain terms, such as
those concerning prices or interests rates, subject to automatic
change by reference to specified indices, such as a cost of living
index or the London Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR"). For
example, in the electricity supply contract discussed above, the
price to be -paid for the electricity by the public utility might be
tied to variations in fuel costs or to the local cost of living index.
While the aim of such a provision is to provide for flexibility
without the risks inherent in renegotiation, negotiations may still
be necessary during the life of the contract in order to apply the
index in unanticipated situations or in the event that the index
itself disappears or becomes inappropriate. 4
4. Open-Term Provisions
Because of the difficulties and risks inherent in trying to ne-
gotiate arrangements to take place far in the future, some pro-
ject agreements specifically provide that certain matters will be
31. See id. at 43.
32. W. PETER, ARBITRATION AND RENEGOTIATION IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS 79 (1995).
33. See Kolo & Walde, supra note 2, at 44.
34. Id.
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negotiated at a later time, perhaps years after the contract has
been signed and the project established. For example, the elec-
tricity project company mentioned above might agree to negoti-
ate appropriate senior management training schemes after it has
constructed the facility and begun to hire local managers. This
type of provision might be called an "open-term" clause because
the matter in question has been left open for negotiation at a
later time.35
In a strict sense, of course, the subsequent negotiation of
the open term is not really a renegotiation of anything, since the
parties have not yet agreed to anything with respect to the open
term. In a broader sense, however, the negotiation of the open
term at a later time will have the effect of modifying the over-all
relationship between the parties. Moreover, it is not inconceiv-
able that one or both of the parties could use the opportunity of
negotiating the open term as an occasion to seek concessions or
changes in other terms through the common negotiating device
of linking issues. For example, the project company might offer
a particularly attractive management training program if the
government would agree to certain desired regulatory changes.
5. Renegotiation Clauses
In an effort to balance the imperatives of contractual stabil-
ity with the need for flexibility in long-term arrangements, some
project agreements may contain a definite clause that obligates
the parties to renegotiate specified terms affected by changes in
circumstances or unforeseen developments, such as those con-
cerning construction costs, governmental regulations, commod-
ity prices, or product specifications. For example, in a contract
for the exploration of petroleum, the Government of Qatar and
an oil company had agreed that they would negotiate future ar-
rangements for the use of natural gas not associated with oil dis-
coveries if commercial quantities of such "non-associated" gas
were later found in the contract area." In addition, as Kolo and
Walde point out, renegotiation clauses in investment contracts
often accompany stabilization clauses, by which a host country
35. See Farnsworth, supra note 10, at 250 (discussing what he calls "agreements
with open terms").
36. Wintershall, A. G., et al. v. Government of Qatar, 28 I.L.M. 795, 814 (Ad Hoc
Arbitral Tribunal 1989); J. Carver & H. Hossain, An Arbitration Case Study: The Dispute
That Never Was, 5 ICSID 311 (1990).
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promises that any changes in laws or regulations will not ad-
versely affect the foreign investment project. The effect of the
two clauses is to obligate the host government and the project
company to enter into negotiations to restore the financial equi-
librium that such new laws and regulations may have de-
stroyed.
An intra-deal renegotiation clause obligates the parties only
to negotiate, not to agree. If the parties have negotiated in good
faith pursuant to the clause but fail to reach agreement, that fail-
ure cannot justify liability on the part of one of the parties. In
the Qatar case mentioned above, the oil company ultimately
found commercial quantities of non-associated natural gas and
entered into negotiations with the Government of Qatar con-
cerning its use. When the two sides failed to reach agreement,
the oil company brought an arbitral proceeding against the Gov-
ernment. The oil company claimed that, by failing to agree to a
renegotiation of their agreement with respect to natural gas, the
Qatar Government had breached its contract with the oil com-
pany. The arbitral tribunal rejected this argument on the
grounds that the duty to negotiate in good faith does not in-
clude an obligation to accept proposals made by the other side
and that the Qatar Government's refusal to accept those propos-
als was based on reasonable commercial judgments. 8
In order to bring finality to the process of intra-deal renego-
tiation, parties sometimes include a "contract adaptation clause"
in long-term project agreements. A contract adaptation clause
stipulates that on the happening of certain specified events the
parties will first seek to negotiate a solution and, failing that, re-
fer their problem to a third party for either a recommendation
or a binding decision, depending on the desire of the parties to
the contract.39 Certain institutions, such as the International
Chamber of Commerce and the World Bank's Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes, have developed rules and fa-
cilities to help carry out the contract adaptation process.4"
37. Kolo & Walde, supra note 2, at 44-45.
38. Wintershall v. Government of Qatar, 28 I.L.M. at 814.
39. See INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ADAPTATION OF CONTRACTs; BARTELS, supra
note 19; ADAPTATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF CONTRACTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Nor-
bert Horn ed., 1985).
40. See INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ADOPTION RULES, Pub. 326 (1978); Mezger,
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IV. EXTRA-DEAL RENEGOTIATION
A. The Context of Extra-Deal Renegotiations
In an extra-deal renegotiation, one party insists on renegoti-
ating the terms of a valid contract that contains no express provi-
sion authorizing renegotiation. Unlike negotiations for the orig-
inal transaction, which are generally fueled by both sides' hopes
for future benefits, extra-deal negotiations begin with both par-
ties' shattered expectations. One side has failed to achieve the
benefits expected from the transaction, while the other is being
asked to give up something for which it bargained hard and
which it hoped to enjoy for a long time. And whereas both par-
ties to the negotiation of a proposed new venture participate
willingly, if not eagerly, one party always participates reluctantly,
if not downright unwillingly, in an extra-deal renegotiation.
Beyond mere disappointed expectations, extra deal renego-
tiations, by their very nature, can create bad feelings and mis-
trust. One side believes it is being asked to give up something to
which it has a legal and moral right. It views the other side as
having gone back on its word, as having acted in bad faith by
reneging on the deal. Indeed, the reluctant party may even feel
that its is being coerced into participating in extra-deal renegoti-
ations since a refusal to do so would result in losing the invest-
ment it has already made in the transaction. Thus, it is very diffi-
cult for the parties to see extra-deal renegotiations as anything
more than a process in which one side wins and the other side
loses. Whereas the negotiation of any transaction in first in-
stance is usually about the degree to which each side will share
in expected benefits, an extra-deal renegotiation is often about
allocating a loss. At the same time, because the parties are
bound together in a legal and economic relationship, it is usu-
ally much harder for one or both of them to walk away from a
troubled transaction than it is for two unconnected parties to
walk away from negotiating a prospective business transaction in
first instance.
In most countries, the law does not oblige a party to enter
into renegotiations, no matter how conditions have changed or
how heavy the costs incurred by the other side since the contract
The ICC Rules for the Adaptation of Contracts, in ADAPTATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF CON-
TRACTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Norbert Horn ed., 1985).
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was originally concluded.4 Indeed, the common law of England
at one time viewed some renegotiated contracts as invalid since
they lacked consideration in those cases in which as a result of
the negotiation a party was promising to do no more than it was
already obligated to do.42 In general, unless some legal doc-
trine, such as frustration, is applicable to excuse performance,
the party being asked to renegotiate an existing agreement has a
legal right to refuse to renegotiate and to insist on performance
in accordance with the letter of the contract. On the other
hand, requests or, in some cases, demands for renegotiation of
an existing agreement are often accompanied by express or im-
plied threats, including governmental intervention, expropria-
tion, slow down in performance, or the complete repudiation or
cancellation of the contract itself.
In response, of course, the other party usually has a legal
remedy in the courts or in arbitration of enforcing its contract
and will often threaten to assert it. However, its willingness to
pursue a legal remedy to its conclusion, rather than renegotiate,
will usually depend on its evaluation of that remedy in relation
to the results its expects from renegotiation. To the extent that
the net benefits (i.e., benefits minus costs) from renegotiation
exceed the expected net benefits from litigation, arbitration, or
other legal remedy, the rational party will ordinarily engage in
the requested renegotiation. But if either before or during the
renegotiation, a party judges that the net benefits to be derived
from litigation will exceed the net benefits to be gained in any
renegotiation, that party will normally pursue its legal remedies.
On its side, the party requesting the renegotiation will be mak-
ing its own cost/benefit analysis of the relative merits of contract
repudiation and its probable fate in arbitration or litigation. As
long as itjudges that the net benefits of repudiating the contract
are less than the net benefits of respecting it, the contractual
relationship will continue. But when, for whatever reason, it
41. Carter, supra note 20, at 185 (stating "the so-called classical law of contract
does not include a doctrine of renegotiation"). "This can be expressed by saying that
there are no legal principles which can be invoked by one party to require the other to
renegotiate a contract." Id.
42. See Stilk v. Myrick, 2 Camp 317, 6 Esp 129 (1809). Recent cases have held that
the concern in enforcing renegotiated contracts should not be lack of consideration
but presence of duress. Williams v. Roffey Bros. & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd., 1 Q.B. 1
(Eng. C.A. 1991). See also S. M. Waddams, Commentary on 'The Renegotiation of Contracts',
13J. CONTRACT L. 204 (1999).
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judges the respective net benefits to be the opposite, the result
will be a demand for renegotiation with the threat of eventual
repudiation in the background. Figure 1 seeks to capture this
dynamic.
The Effect of Changing
Circumstances
Increase
Events - Agreement Benefits
Decrease
Net Benefits of Net Benefits
No Contract of Contract
Net Benefits of Net Benefits Rejection
No Contract of Contract
Copyright 01999 Jeswald W. Salacuse
A party's reluctance to agree to an extra-deal renegotiation
may be due not only to the impact of renegotiation on the con-
tract in question, but on other contracts and business relation-
ships as well. The side being asked to relinquish a contractual
right may feel the need to show other parties with which it has
relationships that it cannot be taken advantage of. Yielding to a
demand for the extra-deal renegotiation of one contract may en-
courage other parties to ask for renegotiation of their agree-
ments as well. Renegotiation of one transaction with one partic-
ular party may set precedent for other renegotiations with other
parties. This concern for the potential ripple effect from extra-
deal renegotiations clearly contributed to the reluctance of in-
ternational commercial banks to yield to demands by individual
developing countries for a revision of loan terms. Concessions
to Mexico would inevitably lead Argentina to demand equal
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treatment in its own extra-deal renegotiations.43
In considering the problem of renegotiation, this section of
the Essay first will examine the causes of renegotiation, then will
focus on a particular project renegotiation, the case of Enron's
Dabhol Project in India, and finally will propose a few principles
to assist parties in conducting extra-deal renegotiations of inter-
national project agreements.
B. The Causes of Extra-Deal Renegotiation
The causes of extra-deal renegotiations in international pro-
ject transactions are numerous, perhaps too numerous to be cat-
alogued here. Nonetheless, most factors contributing to the
need for extra-deal renegotiations seem to fall into two basic cat-
egories: (1) the parties' imperfect contract with respect to their
underlying transaction and (2) changed circumstances after they
have signed their agreement.
1. The Parties' Imperfect Contract
The goal of any written contract is to express the full niean-
ing and extent of the parties' understanding and agreement
concerning the transaction in which they are about to enter. De-
spite lawyers' belief in their abilities to capture that understand-
ing in lengthy and detailed contracts, in practice a written con-
tract, particularly in long-term arrangements, can only achieve
that goal imperfectly, largely for three reasons. First, the parties
to long-term agreements are incapable of predicting all of the
events and conditions that may affect their transactions in the
future. Second, the transaction costs of making contracts limit
the resources that the parties are willing to devote to the con-
tracting process and restrict the ability of the parties to arrive at
a contract that perfectly reflects their common understanding of
the underlying transaction. Thus, an ideal contract for a long-
term transaction is impossible to achieve because it would re-
quire perfect foresight and limitless resources for negotiating
and drafting the contract.44 Moreover, even if the parties had
43. See Alfred Mudge, Sovereign Debt Restructure: A Perspective of Counsel to Agent
Banks, Bank Advisory Groups, and Servicing Banks, in A DANCE ALONG THE PRECIPICE: THE
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT PROBLEM 105, 106
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. ed., 1985).
44. See E. L. Talley, Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and the Liquidated Dam-
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the requisite foresight and resources to draft a perfect contract
reflecting their understanding in all its present and future
dimensions, a court, arbitral panel, or other enforcement body
might not be unable to apply that contract accurately and inex-
pensively.
Third, in international transactions, the problem of accu-
rately negotiating and articulating the parties' intent with re-
spect to a long-term arrangement is particularly difficult because
of the parties' differing cultures, business practices, ideologies,
political systems, and laws-factors that often impede a true
common understanding between them and inhibit the develop-
ment of a working relationship.45 One encounters this problem
particularly in long-term business and financial arrangements.
For example, although the parties to alliances, joint ventures,
and mergers usually announce them with great fanfare at the
start, they often become disappointed within a short time and in
many cases terminate them earlier than expected. Various stud-
ies have found that between 33% and 70% of international alli-
ances surveyed eventually broke up and that business executives
generally consider joint ventures to be notoriously unstable.46
Once the contract has been signed and the parties begin to
work together, numerous conflicts caused by a lack of common
understanding can arise to threaten the very existence of the
transaction. Here are a few examples drawn from experience
around the world:
" A small emerging-market company in a joint venture with
a large U.S. multinational corporation feels much weaker
than its partner and is therefore afraid that it will be taken
advantage of. Consequently, in all dealings with the U.S.
company, it is extremely guarded and slow to reach agree-
ment, an attitude that is hampering the development of
the venture.
" A U.S. firm has created a pharmaceutical company in Rus-
sia with a local partner and wants to confine the venture
to narrow and specific areas. However, its Russian partner
wants to expand into activities unrelated to the U.S. com-
pany's competence, like the production of television pro-
ages Rule, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1195, 1206 (1994); M. E. Tracht, Renegotiation and Secured
Credit: Explaining The Equity of Redemption, 52 VAND. L. REv. 599, 623-24 (1999).
45. See generally MAKING GLOBAL DEALS, supra note 6.
46. See BENJAMIN GOMES-CASSERES, THE ALLIANCE REVOLUTION 52 (1996).
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grams. Disagreement over this question is causing tension
in the relationship.
" A European company and Chinese enterprise have estab-
lished a joint venture that has clear mutual benefits, but
both parties are very cautious about sharing information.
The Chinese partner withholds information about cus-
tomer problems with products and requests for new prod-
uct features. In response, the Europeans have slowed the
transfer of technology badly needed by the venture. The
two sides are also in conflict over advertising expenses.
The Europeans want to spend heavily on advertising while
the Chinese oppose these expenditures as unnecessary.
" A U.S. pharmaceutical firm with a long tradition of strong
presidents and top-down management has acquired a
Swedish firm with a management style that entails getting
the whole management group's approval before making a
big decisions-alla aer I baten, "getting everybody in the
boat," according to the Swedes. The difference in style is
causing severe internal conflict and the possible loss of tal-
ented managers and scientists.
None of these problems could have been solved by contrac-
tual provisions alone. None can be settled by invoking arbitra-
tion or other dispute settlement clauses. The best means of solv-
ing these problems is for the parties to these transactions to sit
down together and refine their relationship through renegoti-
ation of their underlying transaction.
2. Changed Circumstances
Changes in circumstances since the time of the original con-
tract are a second major cause for post-deal renegotiations. A
sudden fall in commodity prices, the outbreak of civil war, or the
imposition of currency controls are examples of changes in cir-
cumstance that have forced the parties back to the negotiating
table. As Professor Raymond Vernon argued over three decades
ago with reference to mineral investment projects, a bargain
once struck will inevitably become obsolete for one of the parties
and issues once agreed upon will be reopened at a later time.
Project agreements, in Vernon's words, are "obsolescing bar-
gains.47
47. RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BA. THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S.
ENTERPRISES 46 (1971).
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Generally speaking, changes in circumstances can either in-
crease or decrease the costs and benefits of the agreement to the
parties. As Figure 1 shows, when a change in circumstances
means that the cost of respecting a contract for one of the par-
ties is greater than the cost of abandoning it, the result is usually
rejection of the deal or a demand for its renegotiation. The no-
tion of "costs" and "benefits" are not limited to purely economic
calculations. Political and social costs and benefits must also be
accounted for. In one case involving a long-term investment
project in Egypt in 1974, the Egyptian government signed an
agreement because it perceived the economic benefits of the
project, a resort complex to be built near the Giza Pyramids, as
exceeding its potential costs. But when public and international
opposition became strong and persistent, the government can-
celled the project because it perceived the political costs to out-
weigh the benefits to be derived from its construction."'
A traditional theme in international business circles is the
lament over the "unstable contract," the profitable agreement
for one side that the other side refuses to respect. Although
hard data on the subject is lacking, anecdotal evidence suggests
that contractual instability is more prevalent in international
business than in the domestic setting. Certainly one can say that
international business transactions involve special factors not
present in domestic deals and that these factors heighten the
risk of contractual instability. First, because the international en-
vironment itself is so unstable, international business dealings
seem particularly susceptible to sudden changes such as cur-
rency devaluation, coups, wars, and radical shifts in governments
and governmental policies.
Second, mechanisms for enforcing agreements are often
less sure or more costly in the international arena than in the
domestic setting. If one side in an international transaction does
not have effective access to the courts or arbitral tribunals to en-
force a contract or to seize assets, the other party may have little
to lose in rejecting the contract that it judges burdensome or in
demanding its renegotiation. Thus, this factor has the effect of
48. See Int'l Comm. Arb.: Award in the Arbitration of S.P.P. (Middle East) Limited, South-
ern Pacific Properties Limited, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Egyptian General Company for
Tourism and Hotels, 22 I.L.M. 752 (1983).
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reducing the costs to be incurred by not fulfilling its contractual
obligations.
Third, foreign governments are often important partici-
pants in international transactions. They often reserve to them-
selves, either explicitly or implicitly, the power to repudiate
agreement on grounds of protecting national sovereignty and
public welfare.
Finally, the world's diverse cultures and legal systems attach
differing meanings and degrees of binding force to a signed con-
tract and recognize varying causes to justify avoidance of oner-
ous contractual burdens.49 For example, a Spanish company in
a long-term transaction with an Indian firm may view their
signed contract as the essence of the deal and the source of the
rules governing their relationship in its entirety. The Indian
partner, however, may see the deal as a partnership that is sub-
ject to reasonable changes over time; a partnership in which one
party ought not to take advantage of purely fortuitous circum-
stances like radical and unexpected movement in exchange rates
or the price of raw materials.5 °
C. A Case of Extra-Deal Renegotiation: Enron's Dabhol Project
in India
One may gain an understanding of the dynamics at work in
extra-deal renegotiation by examining a specific case, the rene-
gotiations involved in Enron's Dabhol Electricity Power Project
in India,51 an incident that received significant media attention
in 1995-1996.52
49. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, Renegotiations in International Business, 4 NEG. J. 347,
347-54 (1988).
50. See Ten Ways, supra note 26, at 25-27.
51. For background, see Richard P. Teisch & William A. Stoever, Enron in India:
Lessons From a Renegotiation, 35 MID-ATLANTIC J. Bus. 51-62 (1999); HARVARD BUSINESS
SCHOOL, ENRON: DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION: THE DABHOL POWER PROJECT IN
MAHARASHTRA, INDIA (A) (HBS Case no. 9-596-099, Mar. 25, 1997) [hereinafter
HARVARD STUDY (A)]; HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, ENRON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION:
THE DABHOL POWER PROJECT IN MAHARASHTRA, INDIA (B) (HBS Case no. 9-596-100, Dec.
16, 1996) [hereinafter HARVARD STUDY (B)]; HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, ENRON DEVEL-
OPMENT CORPORATION: THE DABHOL POWER PROJECT IN MAHARASHTRA, INDIA (C) (HBS
Case no. 9-596-101, Dec. 16, 1996) [hereinafter HARVARD STUDY (C)].
52. See, e.g., John F. Burns, Indian Politics Derail a Big Power Project, N.Y. TIMES, July
5, 1995, at Dl; Mark Nicholson, Survey-Maharashtra 1996: U-Turn that Saved the Project,
FIN. TIMES, July 11, 1996, at 3; The Mugging ofEnron, EUROMONEY, Oct. 1995, at 33; Gary
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1. Background
India, the largest democracy in the world, had a population
exceeding 920 million people in 1995, which was increasing at
an annual rate of 2.3%. A poor country with a per capita income
of US$370 a year, it also had a growing middle class of 250 mil-
lion people located primarily in the cities. The former jewel in
the crown of the British Empire, India gained its independence
in 1947 and is a federation consisting of twenty-six states and six
union territories. It has a strong central government with a 600
member Parliament that is elected every five years. Following
the British parliamentary model, the political party with the ma-
jority in Parliament forms the executive government and that
party's leader becomes the Indian Prime Minister. Each Indian
state has its own legislature and an executive consisting of a
Chief Minister and cabinet of state ministers chosen from the
elected members of the state assembly. State elections are held
every five years, but not necessarily at the same time as central
government elections.5"
From its independence in 1947 until the early 1990s, India
based its economic policies on self-sufficiency, import substitu-
tion, and state control of basic industry and infrastructure. His-
torically, the country was wary of foreign investment and its poli-
cies in that area were extremely restrictive, particularly under
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in the 1970s. With broad popular
support, Gandhi had forced Coca-Cola, IBM, and other multina-
tional firms out of India, thereby driving away foreign invest-
ment for a generation.54 After that, much of India's trade was
with the Soviet Union, whose collapse had severe consequences
for the Indian economy.
55
India's economic policies of self-sufficiency, state control of
basic industry and infrastructure, and restriction on foreign in-
vestment were probably no more apparent than in its electric
power sector. The generation and distribution of electricity was
the exclusive domain of the central and state governments, and
political factors, rather than market forces, were primary consid-
McWilliams & Sharon Moshavi, Enron: Maybe Megadeals Mean Megarisk, Bus. WEEK, Jan.
22, 1996, at 62; Rajiv Rao, Enron's Power Outage in India, FORTUNE, Oct. 2, 1995, at 35-36.
53. See Burns, supra note 52, at Dl.
54. See id.
55. See Vishvjeet Kanwarpal, Power Shift, INDEPENDENT ENERGY, July/Aug., 1996.
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erations in the operation of the Indian electrical power system.
The Indian Energy Supply Act of 194856 initiated this monopoly,
establishing state electricity boards to develop the power sector
at the state level and the Central Electricity Authority to set pol-
icy at the national level. Under this regime, total electricity gen-
erating capacity amounted to approximately 81,000 megawatts
("MW") in 1995, of which state agencies accounted for 65%; the
national government, 31%; and private enterprise, a mere 4%.
As India entered the 1990s, the country's demand for elec-
trical power greatly exceeded its ability to supply it. In 1993-
1994, for example, demand for electricity exceeded supply by
22.5 billion kilowatt hours ("kWh").58 As a result, the country
was experiencing serious power outages with significant negative
impact on industrial production. Furthermore, many rural areas
received little electricity and some 95,000 Indian villages had
none at all. Experts predicted that the situation would only grow
worse in the years ahead. One source estimated that India
would need to create an additional generating capacity of
62,000MW by 2005 at an estimated cost of US$165 billion.59 The
U.S. Energy Department estimated that by the same year India
would need a staggering 140,000MW of additional capacity.
60
The Indian government identified the country's lack of power
resources as a fundamental obstacle to economic development.6'
Neither the Indian central government nor the various state
electricity boards had the necessary capital to develop the capac-
ity to meet the nation's growing demand for electricity. Indeed,
most state electricity boards were insolvent or nearly so due to
the inefficiency of their operations. Power losses from their dis-
tribution grids were as much as 40%. Electricity was stolen from
the system and in many cases pricing for certain privileged
groups, such a farmers, resulted in it being sold for less than the
cost of production. The entire system of electricity generation
and distribution was beset by high costs, entrenched subsidies,
and bloated employment rolls. The state electricity boards were
56. See HARVARD STUDY (A), supra note 51, at 6.
57. See Survey: Business in Asia-Underpowered, ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 1996, at 6.
58. HARVARD STUDY (A), supra note 51, at 6.
59. RAwi SARATHY, ENRON: SUPPLYING ELECTRIC POWER IN INDIA, Case 16.4 (7th ed.
1997).
60. Teisch & Stoever, supra note 51, at 53.
61. INT'L PRIVATE POWER QUARTERLY, 3d Quart., 1996, at 140.
INTERNATIONAL PROJECT AGREEMENTS
selling electricity for as much as 50% below cost and the agricul-
tural sector was paying as little as 20% of the rates charged to
industrial users. As a result, the accumulated losses of the public
power sector amounted to US$6.4 billion in 1996.
One of the consequences of the subsidies and method of
operation was the existence of entrenched constituencies op-
posed to reform of the power sector and especially privatization.
Attempts to raise electricity rates in the state of Haryana, for ex-
ample, resulted in riots and several deaths. At the same time,
growing public demand for increased electricity and the resolu-
tion of a power deficit that was increasingly viewed as a crisis
became an important political issue in the country. In 1991, the
Congress Party narrowly won an election victory with promises to
address the problem.6 2 The Prime Minister P. V. Rao, an advo-
cate of market reforms, appointed as his finance minister
Manmohan Singh, who began a series of reforms, similar to
those being adopted elsewhere in developing countries that
sought to transform the economy from one based on state con-
trol to one based on market forces.63 A central focus of this
package of reforms was the encouragement of private and for-
eign investment in India.
To address the entrenched problems of the power sector,
the new Indian government secured the adoption of the Elec-
tricity Laws Act of 1991,64 which represented an historic shift in
policy. This legislation allowed private sector companies with
100% foreign ownership to build, own, and operate power
plants, mandated a minimum rate of return of 16% on equity,
allowed foreign investors to repatriate profits entirely, permitted
new projects to have a debt-to-equity ratio of 4:1, outlined proce-
dures by which private and foreign-owned projects could sell
electricity to state electricity boards, and specified how electrical
tariff rates should be set.
Despite these substantial reforms, foreign power companies
did not immediately rush to India to develop new projects.65 In
May of 1992, the Indian government therefore took the initiative
of sending its Power Secretary, S. Rajgopal, to the United States
62. See Teisch & Stoever, supra note 51, at 54.
63. SeeJeswald W. Salacuse, From Developing Countries to Emerging Markets: A Chang-
ing Role For Law in the Third World, 33 INT'L LAw. 875, 890 (1999).
64. See Teisch & Stoever, supra note 51, at 52.
65. See id.
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in an effort to attract U.S. companies to invest in the Indian
power sector. One company that responded positively to Mr.
Rajgopal's overtures was Enron Corporation, based in Houston,
Texas.
2. Negotiating the Dabhol Project
Enron Corporation is a diversified energy company that
earned a net income of US$453 million on revenues of approxi-
mately US$9 billion in 1995. Facing the problem of slow growth
in the U.S. energy market, it made a strategic decision to focus
heavily on the demand for power in foreign countries, a demand
that was expected to grow to 560,000MW. In order to pursue
this strategy, it created Enron Development Corporation, a
wholly-owned subsidiary, to exploit the growing worldwide de-
mand for energy, particularly in high growth, emerging market
countries.66 The visit to Enron by the Indian Power Secretary
persuaded the company's leadership that India offered the kind
of opportunities that fit Enron's worldwide strategy. The follow-
ing month, on June 15, 1992, a team of Enron executives arrived
in Delhi, the capital of India, to continue discussions with Cen-
tral government officials and to explore concrete opportunities
for power projects. 67
Under the guidance of Central Government officials, the
Enron team identified the state of Maharashtra as the most ad-
vantageous site from which to begin to serve the Indian electric-
ity market. With a population of nearly 79 million people,
Maharashtra was India's third largest state and the home of its
commercial capital, Bombay (later to be Mumbai). Moreover, as
the country's most important industrial state, Maharashtra had
the highest gross national product per capita in India. At the
time of the Enron visit, the Congress Party, which controlled the
Central Government and was the dominant force in Indian polit-
ics since before the country's independence, also controlled the
Maharashtra state government.
In discussions with officials of the Maharashtra state govern-
ment and the Maharashtra State Electricity Board (or "MSEB"),
66. See HARVARD STUDY (A), supra note 51, at 6.
67. See Government of Maharashtra, Report of the Cabinet Sub-Committee to Review the
Dabhol Power Project, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/enron/enron-b-htm
(giving a chronology of events leading up to the agreement on Dabhol Project).
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Enron proposed the construction of a 2015MW power plant at a
cost of nearly US$3 billion, which would make it the largest for-
eign investment project ever undertaken in India. A plant of
that size requires a large reliable source of fuel. Enron believed
that liquefied natural gas would be the most cost efficient fuel.
A dependable source of natural gas lay across the Indian Ocean
in the Arabian peninsula 1200 miles away; specifically, in the
country of Qatar with which Enron had already entered into a
joint venture for liquefied natural gas development. In view of
the substantial time and capital needed to develop facilities to
liquefy, handle, and ship natural gas, Enron proposed to divide
the electricity project into two phases: a first phase of 695MW
using locally produced fuel and a second phase of 1320MW us-
ing imported liquefied natural gas. Dividing the project into two
phases also permitted Enron to test India's credibility and for
India to determine Enron's ability to deliver a reliable source of
electricity. Enron decided that the best location for its power
plant was the town of Dabhol, located on the Indian Ocean ap-
proximately 120 miles south of Bombay.
An essential requirement for the financial success of the
proposed Dabhol project was the existence of a credible, long-
term purchaser of the electricity it would generate. A commit-
ment from such a buyer was necessary to enable the project com-
pany to secure long-term debt financing and to assure the equity
investors an adequate return on their investment. For the
Dabhol Project to become a reality, it was therefore necessary for
the Maharashtra State Electricity Board, the only potential buyer
in the state, to enter into a long-term power purchase agreement
with the Dabhol Power Project Company. On June 20, 1992, just
three days after the Enron team's arrival in Bombay and only five
days after entering the country for the first time, Enron and the
MSEB signed a memorandum of understanding outlining the
project as described above and proposing a power purchase
agreement, which stipulated that the price to be charged by the
Dabhol Power Project would be no more than 2.40 rupees (7.3
U.S. cents) per kWh.
Over the course of the next year, Enron, the Maharashtra
State Electricity Board, and various concerned Indian central
and state government departments negotiated the precise ar-
rangements under which the proposed Dabhol Power Project
would come into existence and sell electricity in Maharashtra.
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The negotiation encountered three major problems. First,
the World Bank, which served as a consultant to the central gov-
ernment, wrote a report claiming that the Dabhol project was
too big and would create excess capacity for years to come. It
also asserted that the proposed project was too expensive when
compared to electricity generated by more traditional fuels such
as coal. In response, Enron, stressing the environmental bene-
fits of the Dabhol project and the long-term power needs of In-
dia, undertook a lobbying campaign in key departments of the
Indian government and succeeded in countering the negative
effects of the World Bank's report.68
The second and more difficult problem concerned the pro-
ject's expected rate of return. Enron projected a rate of return
to equity holders of 26.52%, which the Government of
Maharashtra as well as the central government's Foreign Invest-
ment Promotion Board considered too high. The Indian side
felt that 20% was much more reasonable. Enron insisted that
given the risks involved and prevailing market expectations for
similar projects, the projected rate of return on the Dabhol pro-
ject was reasonable and that even 30% would be appropriate.
Although the negotiations nearly collapsed over the issue, the
two sides finally agreed on a rate of return of 25.22%, although
various government officials still considered the agreed upon
rate of return as too high. Other difficult issues concerned the
project's capital costs, the government guarantees, the pricing
escalation factor in the power purchase agreement, and the pro-
visions on monetary exchange rate fluctuations.
The third problem that surfaced during the negotiations
was a growing negative view of the project among certain seg-
ments of the Indian public. Opponents of the project strongly
criticized its high rate of return, the high electricity tariff that
Indians would ultimately have to bear, and the government's fail-
ure to engage in competitive bidding, as had been standard
practice with other power plants constructed in the country. Ac-
cusations were made that Indian officials had been bribed to ap-
prove the project. Public demonstrations against the project
took place and at one point a bomb exploded in the hotel in
68. See id.; see also Milind Palnitkar & K. S. Nayar, Enron Decision: Shockwaves, INDIA
ABROAD, Aug. 11, 1995, at 24.
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which the Enron team was staying.6 9 Despite these manifesta-
tions of public opposition, negotiations continued.
To undertake the project, Enron, with two U.S. minority
partners, General Electric and Bechtel, each of which held 10%
of the equity, formed the Dabhol Power Company in April 1993.
On December 8, 1993, some twenty months after the Indian
Power Secretary's first contact with Enron, the Dabhol Power
Company and the Maharashtra State Electricity Board signed the
Power Purchase Agreement, formally launching the Dabhol Pro-
ject, the biggest foreign investment project ever undertaken in
India. The basic provisions of the Power Purchase Agreement
were as follows:
" The Dabhol Power Company agreed to design, finance,
and build within thirty-three months an electrical generat-
ing plant with a base load capacity of 625MW and addi-
tional peak load capacity of 70MW. Failure to provide
commercial service within thirty-three months of the
deadline would result in penalty payments by the Com-
pany to the MSEB of US$14,000 per day. Moreover, if the
Company failed to reach baseload capacity of 625MW
within one year after the beginning of commercial service
it would be required to pay US$100 for each kilowatt be-
low the required 625MW requirement.
" The Maharashtra State Electricity Board and the Govern-
ment of the State of Maharashtra agreed to provide the
land and the necessary infrastructure, including roads to
the site, communications, and transmission lines from the
power plant to the MSEB grid.
* The Maharashtra State Electricity Board agreed to
purchase what amounted to at least 90% of the Dabhol
plant's output. It was obligated to pay for electricity from
the Dabhol Power Company under a complex payment
formula for an initial period of twenty years. The formula
consisted of two parts: (1) a capacity payment determined
by the baseload and peak capacities, regardless of the
amount of power actually used by the MSEB and (2) an
energy payment based on the actual amount of power pro-
duced. The result of the formula was that the estimated
cost of power to the MSEB would be 7.05 U.S. cents per
kWh at the commencement of commercial operations.
69. See HARVARD STUDY (A), supra note 51, at 6.
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The tariff was indexed to Indian inflation rates and was
expected to rise to 11.34 U.S. cents per kWh by 2015.
" Although the MSEB's payments were to be made in ru-
pees, it also had the responsibility of bearing any changes
in the dollar-rupee exchange rate over time.
" The Maharashtra State government guaranteed the MSEB
payment obligations to the Dabhol Power Company, and
the Central government issued a counter guarantee.
• Although Indian Law governed the Power Purchase
Agreement, the parties agreed to settle any disputes aris-
ing under the agreement by binding arbitration in
London.
* At the end of twenty years, MSEB had the option to ex-
tend the Power Purchase Agreement for an additional five
or ten years at its option. If it chose not to renew the
Agreement, the MSEB would be required to purchase the
plant at 50% of its then depreciated replacement value.
Enron then moved rapidly to finance and implement the
project. In addition to the equity contribution of US$279 7° mil-
lion from the project partners, it ultimately secured loan com-
mitments of US$643 million from banks and lending agencies.7'
3. The Forces for Changing the Deal
Public opposition to the Dabhol Power Project grew as con-
struction activity proceeded. Activists and organizations filed
lawsuits in the Bombay High Court, challenging the legality of
the project and the processes by which it was negotiated.72 Al-
though the Courts dismissed the complaints, political opposition
continued to mount. Specifically, the opposition alliance of the
Bharatiya Janata Party ("BJP") and the Shiva Sena took up the
70. Enron Power Corporation, which had the responsibility for construction man-
agement, operations, maintenance, and fuel management, contributed US$233 mil-
lion; Bechtel Enterprises, a construction contractor on the project, contributed equity
of US$28 million; and General Electric, also a construction contractor, also had an
equity interest of US$28 million.
71. Enron, Press Release: Dabhol Project Achieves Financial Close: Resumes Construction,
available at http://www.enron.com/india/Newsroom/PressRelease02.htm (Dec. 10,
1996) [hereinafter Dabhol Resumes Construction]. The loan commitment were as follows:
A bank syndicate led by Bank of America and ABN Amro-US$150 million; Overseas
Private Investment Corporation-US$100 million; Industrial Development Bank of In-
dia and other Indian financial institutions-rupee loans equivalent to US$96 million;
and the United States Export-Import Bank of the United States-US$298 million. Id.
72. See, e.g., Ramdas Nayak v. Union of India, 1995 AIR 225.
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issue on the floor of the Maharashtra State Assembly. As they
prepared for state election scheduled for March 1995, they made
opposition to the Dabhol Project a centerpiece in their cam-
paign. Emphasizing Hindu nationalism and warning against the
dangers of American economic and cultural imperialism, BJP-
Shiv Shena politicians encouraged public opposition to the pro-
ject in their campaign rhetoric. They charged that Enron was
offering India nothing that India could not do for itself, that the
power tariff was exorbitant and would hurt the poor, that En-
ron's rate of return was exploitative, and that the whole negotia-
tion process had been tainted by corruption.7" According to one
observer of the campaign, the Dabhol Project became "a na-
tional icon . . . rallying economic nationalists suspicious of the
post-liberalisation arrival of foreign investment."
74
In the State Assembly elections of March 1995, the BJP-Shiv
Sena alliance won a majority of seats and thereby ousted from
government the incumbent Congress Party, which most observ-
ers had expected would continue to hold power. In May, the
new government appointed a cabinet sub-committee, chaired by
the deputy Chief Minister, Shri Gopinath Munde, to investigate
the Dabhol Project. The committee submitted a report in July
recommending that the State repudiate Phase I of the project
and cancel Phase II. The Report based its recommendation on
several grounds, including the absence of transparency in the
negotiation process, the lack of competitive bidding procedure,
the relaxation by the previous government of certain regulations,
relating to the project, the great expense of the project, the high
electricity tariff rate and its continuing escalation, the obligation
of the Maharashtra State Electricity Board to pay for electricity
whether or not it was actually used, the World Bank Report's
objections to the project, and the failure of the project negotia-
tions to address environmental concerns.
75
On the basis of this report, the State government, under its
new Chief Minister, Manohar Joshi, and the Maharashtra State
Electricity Board formally cancelled the Power Purchase Agree-
73. See Burns, supra note 52, at D1.
74. See Nicholson, supra note 52, at 3.
75. See Report of the Cabinet Sub-Committee to Review the Dabhol Power Project, reprinted in
Human Rights Watch Report, The Enron Corporation: Corporate Complicity in Human
Rights Violations, Appendix B (Jan. 1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/
1999/enron/; see also, HARVARD STUDY (B), supra note 51, at 2-3.
2001] 1351
1352 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:1319
ment with the Dabhol Power Company.76 Chief Minister Joshi
stated: "This decision is not against the United States; but
against the Dabhol project .... The deal is against the interests
of Maharashtra. Accepting this deal would indicate an absolute
lack of self-respect and would amount to betraying the trust of
the people."77
At this point in its development, the Dabhol Project had in-
curred sunk costs of approximately US$300 million and each day
of delay on construction was estimated to cost an additional
US$250,000.
In response, the Dabhol Power Company and the project
sponsors invoked their legal rights under the Power Purchase
Agreement by instituting arbitration in London against the
Maharashtra Electricity Board and the Maharashtra State govern-
ment, claiming damages in excess of US$300 million. The State
of Maharashtra reacted by bringing suit in the Bombay High
Court to invalidate the arbitration clause and the guarantee of
MSEB payments on the grounds that both had been secured
through illegal means. The U.S. government issued a statement
critical of the contract repudiation and asserted that it would
have negative consequences for foreign investment in India.
Foreign investors considering India became demonstrably more
cautious and expressed their concern over the incident. The In-
dian press appeared to be divided over the wisdom of Maharash-
tra State's action. In the face of this growing controversy, the
Deputy Chief Minister Munde, who had chaired the Dabhol Pro-
ject review committee, stated, "Our decision is firm. We do not
wish to renegotiate.""'
4. Renegotiating the Dabhol Project
While pursuing its legal remedies in arbitration, Enron
made it clear to the Maharashtra State authorities that it would
be willing to renegotiate the Dabhol Project. In the fall of 1995,
discussions took place between Enron executives and Maharash-
tra officials and political leaders, which culminated in a meeting
between Chief Minister Joshi and the chief executive officers of
76. Marcus W. Brauchli, Enron Project Is Scrapped by Indian State, WALL ST.J., Aug. 4,
1995, at A3; Rao, supra note 52, at 35-36.
77. See Rao, supra note 52.
78. HARVARD STUDY (B), supra note 51, at 5.
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the Enron Corporation and its subsidiary, the Enron Develop-
ment Corporation, intended to find a way of reviving the Dabhol
Project. Shortly thereafter, Chief MinisterJoshi announced that
Maharashtra State would undertake a review of the project and
promised to reopen negotiations in November. To carry out the
review and renegotiation, he appointed a panel consisting of the
President of the MSEB, the Power Secretary of Maharashtra
State, and four other academic and industry experts, in contrast
to the first review panel, which had consisted of government
ministers.79
During a period of two weeks, the Review Panel not only
met with Enron to discuss proposals for restructuring the
Dabhol Project, but it also listened to principal critics of the pro-
ject. The key issues in the discussions with Enron concerned the
electricity tariff, capital costs, payment terms, and the environ-
ment."o Finally, on November 19, 1995, the Panel submitted a
proposal to the Maharashtra State Government embodying the
renegotiated terms of the Dabhol project to which the Panel and
Enron had agreed. Enron agreed to suspend its arbitration pro-
ceedings in London until December 10. Ultimately, on January
8, 1996, after some delay, the Maharashtra government agreed
to accept the Panel proposal for renegotiated terms, l which
eventually became the basis for amending the Power Purchase
Agreement between the Dabhol Power Company, the State of
Maharashtra, and the MSEB, an event that took place on Febru-
ary 23, 1996. Ultimately, in July after much debate, the Indian
Central Government, which had also undergone a recent elec-
tion that led to a new governing coalition, approved the
amended Power Purchase Agreement and extended the central
government's counter guarantee of Maharashtra's obligations,
thereby removing the final barrier to the revived project. In Au-
gust 1996, Enron agreed to abandon its arbitration proceeding
in London, and Maharashtra state agreed to drop its case in the
Mumbai high court.
Despite the renegotiation and government approvals, En-
ron was not able to resume construction immediately. While the
79. HARVARD STUDY (C), supra note 51, at 1.
80. Shekhar Hattangadi, Enron, Indian State Revive Power Project, WALL ST. J., Nov.
22, 1995, at A4.
81. See McWilliams & Moshavi, supra note 52, at 62.
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conflict and renegotiation between Enron and the government
was evolving, various labor unions, public interest groups, and
activists brought some twenty-four suits in the Indian courts to
stop the project. Even though the Maharashtra government had
approved the terms of the renegotiated agreement, the courts
ruled that until these suits were resolved, construction on the
project would have to remain suspended. Eventually, the Indian
courts held against the plaintiffs in all of these cases, but it was
not until December 1996 that the last suit was dismissed and con-
struction resumed on the Dabhol Project. 2
5. The Terms of the Renegotiated Deal
The renegotiation resulted in a modification of all of the
principal terms of the Power Purchase Agreement. A summary
of the changes is as follows:
a. Equity Participation. Although the project company orig-
inally had only three U.S. shareholders (Enron 80%;
Bechtel, 10%; and General Electric, 10%), the renegoti-
ated deal provided for the introduction of the
Maharashtra State Electricity Board as a 30% sharehold-
er with a proportionate reduction in Enron's interest.
Thus the new equity structure was Enron, 50%; MSEB,
30%; Bechtel, 10%; and General Electric, 10%. The in-
troduction of an Indian partner seemed a way of meet-
ing public suspicion over foreign investment.
b. Output Capacity. Although the World Bank's report had
criticized the original proposed power plant as being
too large, the renegotiated terms provided for a plant
of even greater output capacity. The capacity of Phase I
was increased from 695MW to 826MW and total capaci-
ty after the completion of Phase II under the renegoti-
ated agreement was increased to 2450MW, as compared
to 2105MW in the original proposal.
82. Enron, Press Release: Court Rules in Favor of Dabhol Power, Dabhol Construction to
Resume, available at http://www.enron.com/india/Newsroom/Press-Releases03.htm
(Dec. 2, 1996); Dabhol Resumes Construction, supra note 72.
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c. Capital Costs. To respond to the criticism that the pro-
ject was too expensive, the renegotiation reduced the
capital costs from US$2.85 billion to US$2.5 billion.
The panel achieved this result by removing the regassifi-
cation plant from the Dabhol project and treating it as a
separate project, for which the power plant would pay a
fixed charge. This change transformed a portion of
capital costs to an on going variable cost that would be
included in the new power tariff.8" A portion of the re-
duction in capital costs can also be attributed to the
worldwide fall in the price of generation equipment.
d. Power Tariff The politics of Maharashtra demanded a
reduction in the power tariff to be paid by the MSEB.
Accordingly, the panel with the agreement of Enron
recommended a reduction in the power tariff from ap-
proximately 7.03 U.S. cents per kWh, subject to a 4%
annual escalation on fixed charges, to 6.03, subject to
fuel price and exchange rate fluctuations, until Phase II
became operational, at which time the tariff would be-
come 5.08 U.S. cents per kWh, subject to fuel price and
exchange rate fluctuations for twenty years, but with no
escalation.
e. Fuel. The original proposal had called for distillate oil
to be used in Phase I and liquefied natural gas in Phase
II. The renegotiated terms provided in Phase I for the
use of naphtha, a fuel that was produced locally, thus
sparing India foreign exchange costs of importing oil
for the project.
f. Environment. The original power purchase agreement
contained no provisions with respect to environmental
protection. The renegotiated terms stated that Enron
and the Dabhol Power Company would pay for monthly
83. See BJP Collapse Muddies Enron/Dabhol Waters, POWER AsIA, June 10, 1996. Later,
the Central Electricity Authority and the Ministry of Power, both agencies of the Indian
Central government, persuaded the state to put the regassification facility back into the
project without any changes in the renegotiated power purchase agreement. This fur-
ther development resulted in a real capital cost increase but a small tariff reduction
since the lower rate no longer included amortization of the LNG facility. Id.
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air and water surveys, would plant trees, manage efflu-
ent discharged into the sea as to protect marine law,
and would employ one person from any family dis-
placed due to the construction of the plant.84
g. Other Terms. Various other terms were introduced into
the renegotiated agreement. For example, Enron and
the Dabhol Power Company agreed to use local suppli-
ers and supplies to the extent possible and to employ a
bidding procedure in purchasing power equipment.
Moreover, Enron agreed to bear costs of approximately
US$175 million caused by the State's cancellation of the
contract provided that the construction was renewed by
February 1, 1996. Although Maharashtra state failed to
meet this deadline, Enron later also agreed to waive the
daily interest charges of US$250,000 that had been ac-
cruing as a result of work stoppage, thereby saving
Maharashtra state an additional approximately US$10
million.85
6. The Aftermath
Both Enron and the State of Maharashtra claimed the rene-
gotiation as a victory. The Maharashtra government pointed to
the reduction in the power tariff and capital costs as major con-
cessions favoring the state.86 On the other hand, the enlarged
project capacity was clearly a renegotiated term favorable to En-
ron, and a significant portion of the capital cost reduction result
from favorable market developments with respect to generating
equipment, not a transfer of value from Enron to the state of
Maharashtra.
Despite government statements of satisfaction with the rene-
gotiation, significant public opposition to the project continued.
Although the Indian courts eventually dismissed all the numer-
ous lawsuits against the project, public protests and demonstra-
tions at the project site persisted. The measures taken by the
Maharashtra state government and the police to deal with these
protests have prompted concerns with respect to human rights
84. HARVARD STUDY (C), supra note 51, at 4.
85. Legal Hurdles Dropped as Dabhol Project Gets Set, POWER ASIA, Aug. 4, 1996.
86. India: Power Struggle, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 1996, at 37; Gary McWilliams &
Sharon Moshavi, More Power To India, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 22, 1996, at 62.
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violations.17 Nonetheless, in May 1999, the Dabhol Power Pro-
ject was completed and began commercial operation. In that
same month, Enron secured financing of US$1.87 billion for
Phase II of the Project," which is scheduled for completion at
the end of 2001.9
D. The Lessons of Dabhol and Some Principles to Guide Extra-Deal
Project Renegotiations
Since the risk of extra-deal project renegotiations is always
present in any project, participants planning international
projects need to ask two basic questions:
1. How can the likelihood of extra-deal renegotiations be
reduced?
2. When renegotiations actually occur, how should the par-
ties conduct them to make the process as productive and
fair as possible?
In answering these questions, project participants need to
distinguish actions they should take before and after the transac-
tion has broken down and one party is demanding renegotiation
or threatening to reject the deal entirely. Thus, in the case of
the Dabhol Project, one needs to consider the actions that En-
ron might have taken to have avoided the conflict and renegoti-
ation that actually took place, as well as the actions that it took
when faced with the cancellation of the Power Purchase Agree-
ment.
1. Principles to Follow Before Deal Break-Down
a. Work to Create a Business Relationship Between the Parties
and Recognize that a Signed Contract Does Not Necessarily
Create an International Business Relationship
For a long-term transaction to be stable and productive for
both sides, it must be founded on a business relationship, a com-
plex set of interactions characterized by cooperation and a mini-
mal degree of trust. A relationship also implies a connection
between the parties. It is the existence of a solid business rela-
87. See supra note 75.
88. Enron, Press Release: Financing Complete, Construction Commences on Second Phase
of Dabhol Power Project, Press Release (May 6, 1999), available at http://www.enron.com.
89. Enron International, Our Presence in India, available at http://
www.ei.enron.com/presence/projects/India.
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tionship between the parties to a transaction that allows them to
face unforeseen circumstances and hardships in a productive
and creative manner. A contract, no matter how detailed and
lengthy, does not create a business relationship. Just as a map is
not a country, but only an imperfect description thereof, a con-
tract is not a business relationship, but only an imperfect sketch
of what the relationship should be. A contract may be a neces-
sary condition for a business relationship in some, but not all,
countries; however, it is never a sufficient condition for a busi-
ness relationship in any country. A business negotiator, while
necessarily concerned about contractual provisions, should also
be concerned that a solid foundation for a business relationship
is in place. Accordingly, a project negotiator should also ask a
variety of non-legal and non-contractual questions during the
contracting process: How well do the parties know one another?
What mechanisms are in place to foster communications be-
tween the two sides after the contract is signed? To what extent
are there genuine business links and connections between the
parties to the project? Is the deal balanced and advantageous
for both sides?
One may argue that these issues are management problems
or personnel questions, matters that have nothing to do with law
or the lawyer's work in negotiating and structuring international
transactions. On the other hand, if the lawyer's fundamental
task is to help the client establish the best possible basis for an
international transaction, not just to draft a contract, then these
issues should be of concern from the very start of negotiations.
Rather than see his or her basic objective in an international
business negotiation as merely securing an advantageous con-
tract for the client, an international lawyer ought also to strive
for the goal of negotiating a basis for the client to work produc-
tively with a foreign partner and to help the parties find an over-
riding mutuality of purpose. Throughout project negotiations,
international business lawyers must keep asking themselves a ba-
sic first question: "After the contract, what?"
While a contract may seem the essence of a business rela-
tionship in North America, other cultures give it far less impor-
tance. Indeed, different cultures may tend to view the very pur-
pose of a negotiation differently. For North Americans, the goal
of a business negotiation, first and foremost, is usually to arrive
at a signed contract between the parties. They consider a signed
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contract as a definitive set of rights and duties that strictly binds
the two sides, an attitude succinctly summed up in the statement
"a deal is a deal."
Japanese and other Asian cultures, on the other hand, often
consider that the real goal of a negotiation is not a signed con-
tract, but the creation of a relationship between the two sides.
Although the written contract expresses the relationship, the es-
sence of the deal is the relationship itself. For Americans, sign-
ing a contract is closing a deal; for many Asians, signing a con-
tract might more appropriately be called opening a relationship.
Regardless of culture, in most countries whenever one party
fails to respect its contractual obligations to another party, the
existence of a good relationship between the parties is more
likely to facilitate a negotiated resolution of their dispute than if
no such relationship exists. This is because the aggrieved party
views the relationship with the offending party as more valuable
than the individual claim arising out of the failure to honor the
contractual provision. Thus banks are willing to renegotiate
loans with delinquent debtors when the prospect of continuing
business is likely.
In reviewing the Dabhol Project case, one concludes that
although a detailed contract governed the project, no real busi-
ness relationship appears to have existed at all between Enron,
on the one hand, and the Maharashtra State Electricity Board
and the various concerned Indian government departments, on
the other. Specifically, at the time the Power Purchase Agree-
ment was signed, there was no real connection between Enron
and India itself. No Indian party was to participate in any mean-
ingful way in the development and management of the Dabhol
Power Company. The Indian public had little knowledge of En-
ron or of the proposed Dabhol Project, which was negotiated
largely in secrecy. The only role for any Indian entity was to buy
electricity according to the Power Purchase Agreement. The ne-
gotiation of the contract had been contentious, and Enron ap-
peared to have little appreciation for the concerns of the Indian
public about foreign investment in general and the manner in
which the Dabhol Power Project was being negotiated and devel-
oped in particular. Finally, given the size and importance of the
Dabhol Project, Enron and India seemed to know relatively little
about one another. Thus, after nearly eighteen months of nego-
tiation, Enron emerged with a contract but no real business rela-
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tionship. It had no real connection to any Indian party, and had
established no basis for cooperation and trust with either
Maharashtra State Electricity Board, the Maharashtra State Gov-
ernment, or the Indian public. Indeed, the situation was quite
the contrary. Before ground had been broken for the project,
important segments of the Indian public were either suspicious
of, or downright hostile toward, Enron.
Had Enron thought in terms of relationship building, in ad-
dition to contract negotiation, and taken actions accordingly, it
might have avoided the cancellation of the contract. For exam-
ple, the involvement of the Maharashtra State Electricity Board
as a partner in the project from the very start might have been a
crucial first step in building an effective business relationship be-
tween Enron and India. Moreover, given India's historical am-
bivalence toward foreign investment, it was essential that a deal
of the magnitude of the Dabhol Project be, and appear to be,
balanced and fair to both sides. The Project's high rate of re-
turn and high power tariff raised important questions in the
minds of the Indian public that Enron should have sought to
address.
b. Building a Relationship Takes Time, So Don't Rush
Negotiations and Use Negotiation Preliminaries Fully
Project negotiators who wish to lay the foundation for a bus-
iness relationship as well as to conclude a contract know that
sufficient time is required to achieve these goals. In the case of
the Dabhol Project, the speed with which Enron and the
Maharashtra State electricity Board achieved a contract not only
did not permit the parties to develop a relationship, but the pro-
ject's opponents viewed that speed as a defect in the negotiation
process. Opponents and the Indian press criticized the original
Enron transaction as having been done in "unseemly haste," and
the Maharashtra state government based one of its ground for
canceling the Power Purchase Agreement on flawed "fast track
procedures" that had circumvented established practice for de-
veloping power projects in the past. In particular, the Cabinet
Sub-Committee pointed to the fact that the Memorandum of
Understanding had been signed less than three days after the
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Enron team's arrival in Bombay.9 °
While speed of negotiation may appeal to American negoti-
ators as "efficient" and a recognition of the fact that "time is
money,"9' for other cultures a quick negotiation of a compli-
cated project transaction may imply overreaching by one of the
parties, insufficient consideration of the public interest, or even
corruption. Thus negotiations done in haste may be subject to
challenge later on.
The difference in view between American and other negoti-
ators concerning desirability of fast negotiations may explain
why Asians tend to give more time to negotiation preliminaries,
while Americans want to rush through this first phase in deal
making. Asians consider negotiation preliminaries, whereby the
parties seek to get to know one another thoroughly, a crucial
foundation for a good business relationship. For negotiators
who are concerned primarily with achieving a contract and are
less cognizant of the need to lay a foundation for a relationship,
negotiation preliminaries may seem less important when the
goal is merely a contract.92
As a general rule, North American executives and lawyers
generally want to "dispense with the preliminaries" and "to get
down to cases." Consequently, they have a tendency to rush
through prenegotiation and to view it as not really important to
building a strong deal. Enron clearly followed the typical North
American pattern, for it secured a memorandum of understand-
ing on establishing the largest foreign investment project ever
undertaken in India just five days after the Enron team had en-
tered the country for the first time.
90. See Report of the Cabinet Subcommittee to Review the Dabhol Power Project, supra note
75.
91. Enron's Rebecca Mark: "You Have To Be Pushy and Aggressive," Bus. WEEK (Feb.
24, 1997), available at http://www.businessweek.com/1997/08/b351586.htm. In a
1997 interview in Businessweek, Rebecca Mark, chairman and CEO of Enron Interna-
tional, reflected this attitude with regard to the process leading up to the Dabhol Pro-
ject:
We were extremely concerned with time, because time is money for us. Peo-
ple thought we were pushy and aggressive. But think of the massive bureau-
cracy we had to move. How do you move a bureaucracy that has done things
one way its entire collective life? You have to be pushy and aggressive.
Id.
92. See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, MAKING DEALS IN ASIA: PRIVATE INVESTMENTS
ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1995, at 23-31
(1995).
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Asians tend to devote more time and attention to the pre-
liminary phase of deal making than do Americans. Most Asians
view the preliminaries as an essential foundation to any business
relationship; consequently, they recognize the need to conduct
them with care before actually making a decision to undertake
substantive negotiations of a deal. No Japanese power develop-
ment firm would have pushed to conclude a memorandum of
understanding on a power purchase agreement within five days
of arriving in India.
While Enron seems to have taken pride in the speed with
which it concluded the memorandum of understanding and the
Power Purchase Agreement, one may ask whether a greater in-
vestment of time in the negotiation process would have in the
end proved cost-effective by avoiding the costs and delays of re-
negotiation later on.
c. Consider Providing for Renegotiation in
Appropriate Transactions
If the risk of change and uncertainty is constant in interna-
tional business, how should deal-makers cope with it? The tradi-
tional method is to write detailed contracts that seek to foresee
all possible eventualities. Most modern contracts deny the possi-
bility of change. They therefore rarely provide for adjustments
to meet changing circumstances. This assumption of contrac-
tual stability has proven false time and time again.
As suggested above, rather than to view a long-term transac-
tion as frozen in the detailed provisions of a lengthy contract, it
may be more realistic and wiser to think of an international deal
as a continuing negotiation between the parties to the transactions
as they seek to adjust their relationship to the rapidly changing
international environment in which they must work together.
Accordingly, another approach to the problem of contractual in-
stability is to provide in the contract that at specified times or on
the happening of specified events, the parties may renegotiate or
at least review certain of the contract's provisions. In this ap-
proach, the parties deal with the problem of renegotiation
before, rather than after, they sign their contract. Both sides
recognize at the outset that the risk of changed circumstances is
high in any long-term relationship and that at sometime in the
future either side may seek to renegotiate or adjust the contract
INTERNATIONAL PROJECT AGREEMENTS
accordingly. Rather than dismiss the possibility of renegotiation
and then be forced to review the entire contract at a later time in
an atmosphere of hostility between the partners, it may be better
to recognize the possibility of renegotiation at the outset and set
down a clear framework within which to conduct the process.
Although commentators93 have urged this approach in long-
term business relationships, it is rarely used. Perhaps the new
era of global finance and business requires a re-examination of
renegotiation provisions.
Other than through the use of force majeure clauses, most
contracts implicitly deny the possibility of change and therefore
make no provision whatsoever to meet changing circumstance.
This assumption of contractual stability has proven false time
and again. For example, most mineral development agreements
assume they will continue unchanged for a period of up to 99
years, yet they rarely remain unmodified for more than a few
years.94 The traditional approach in international business has
been to assume and insist on the stability of international agree-
ments and only grudgingly and bitterly agree to renegotiations
in the face of changing circumstances.
d. Consider a Role for Mediation or Conciliation in the Deal
A third party can often help the two sides with their negotia-
tions and renegotiations. Third parties, whether called
mediators, conciliators, advisors, or something else, can assist in
building and preserving business relations and in resolving dis-
putes without resorting to arbitration or adjudication. Conse-
quently, persons planning and negotiating international busi-
ness and financial transactions should consider the possibility of
building into their deals a role for some form of mediation. For
example, the contract might provide that before either party can
invoke arbitration to settle their dispute, they must use the ser-
vices of a mediator or conciliator in trying to negotiate a settle-
ment of their conflict.
2. Renegotiation Principles After Deal Break-Down
When one side has demanded renegotiation of the basic
93. See, e.g., STOEVER, supra note 24, at 27.
94. See DAVID N. SMITH & LEWIS L. T. WELLS, NEGOTIATING THIRD-WORLD MINERAL
AGREEMENTS 18 (1975).
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contract governing their relationship, how should one or both of
the parties proceed?
a. Don't Become Hostile, Belligerent, or Moralistic in
Response to Demands for Renegotiation
Demands for renegotiation of the contract by one party to a
project contract are often met with hostility, belligerency, or
moralistic objections by the other side. Such arguments are
hardly ever effective in persuading the other side to end its insis-
tence on renegotiation. The party asking for renegotiation al-
most always is able to assert equally moralistic arguments justify-
ing the need to renegotiate the contract. Like the Maharashtra
state government, a party resisting a contract will usually offer a
variety of legal and moral arguments for its action: the contract
is exploitative, the negotiators were corrupt, one side used du-
ress, the other side was ignorant of all the underlying factors,
and the basic circumstances of the deal have changed in a funda-
mental way.
While respect for agreements is indeed a norm in virtually
all societies and may even rise to the level of a universal principle
of law, most cultures also provide relief, in varying degrees, from
the binding force of a contract in a variety of circumstances. "A
deal is a deal" (pacta sunt servanda) is certainly an expression of a
fundamental rule of human relations, but so is the statement
"things have changed" (rebus sic stantibus). While a request for
extra-deal renegotiations may provoke bad feelings in one party,
an outright refusal to renegotiate may also create ill will on the
other side since it will be seen as an attempt to force adherence
to a bargain that has become unreasonable. Thus, throughout
the crisis provoked by the Maharashtra state government's can-
cellation of the Power Purchase Agreement, Enron consistently
and quite wisely made known its willingness to renegotiate the
Power Purchase Agreement, a posture that ultimately led to a
satisfactory resolution of the conflict. While it did begin to pur-
sue its legal remedy in arbitration immediately, it did not be-
come belligerent or hostile toward the Maharashtra govern-
ment.
95
95. See Teisch & Stoever, supra note 51, at 62,
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b. Understand that the Other Side May Believe It has a
Legitimate Basis For Renegotiating the Contract
How can renegotiation be justified in the face of a detailed
contract that contains no specific provision authorizing it? One
may argue that in many transactions, particularly between par-
ties from different cultures, there are in effect two agreements,
the legal contract that sets out enforceable rights and duties and
their "foundation relationship" that reflects their fundamental
understanding in all its dimensions, legal and non-legal. As indi-
cated earlier in this Essay, the author has been led to this conclu-
sion from statements made consistently by international business
executives that once the contract is signed "it is put into the files
and what matters for purposes of the transaction is the relation-
ship between the parties." An important, implied aspect of this
relationship is an understanding, given the impossibility of pre-
dicting all future contingencies, that if problems develop in the
future the two sides will engage in negotiations to maximize the
joint gains in their relationship. At the same time, the legal con-
tract grants the parties the right to invoke certain enforcement
mechanisms, such as litigation or arbitration, if specified legal
obligations have not been performed by the other side. The ag-
grieved party will only pursue them fully, however, if it judges
the benefits of a legal remedy to be greater than its costs, one of
which is the loss of any relationship with the other side. But a
party usually cannot accurately make that calculation unless it
has engaged in some form of renegotiation first. One can argue
that one of the purposes of the delays inherent in pursuing legal
remedies, such as a lawsuit or arbitration, is to give the parties an
opportunity to negotiate an efficient solution to their conflict.96
Thus, although Enron began arbitration in London immediately
after the Maharashtra government's cancellation of the power
purchase agreement, it also immediately communicated to the
government its willingness to renegotiate. The delay inherent in
the arbitration process allowed the renegotiation to take place,
and Enron eventually abandoned its arbitration because it
judged the value of the renegotiated agreement to be worth
much more than any damages it might receive in arbitration.
96. See Tracht, supra note 44, at 622 (arguing that well-crafted security arrange-
ment should encourage lender and borrower to renegotiate their loan if renegotiation
is efficient).
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c. Evaluate the Worth of the Claim for Breach of Contract
Against the Value of a Continuing Relationship with
the Other Side
The extent of a party's willingness to renegotiate a project
agreement will usually be in direct proportion to the value it at-
taches to its potential future relationship with the other side,
particularly if it judges the potential relationship with the other
side to be worth more than the claim for breach of contract. For
example, one of the factors that encouraged Enron to renegoti-
ate with the Maharashtra government after it had cancelled the
contract was the prospect of long-term relationships in India in-
volving many energy projects in the future. Enron clearly evalu-
ated that relationship to be worth much more than winning an
arbitral award in a case that would certainly be a long protracted
struggle. Even if it won an award for US$300 million, that vic-
tory would not only drastically reduce its business prospects in
the economically important state of Maharashtra, but probably
in all of India as well.
d. Look for Ways to Create Value in the Renegotiation
Because of differences in culture or personality, or both,
persons appear to approach deal making with one of two basic
attitudes: that a negotiation is either a process in which both
can gain (win/win) or a struggle in which, of necessity, one side
wins and the other side loses (win/lose). Win/win negotiators
see deal making as a collaborative and problem-solving process;
win/lose negotiators see it as confrontational. In a reflection of
this dichotomy, negotiation scholars have concluded that these
approaches represented two basic paradigms of the negotiation
process: (1) distributive bargaining (i.e., win/lose) and (2) in-
tegrative bargaining or problem-solving (i.e., win/win).97 In the
former situation, the parties see their goals as incompatible,
while in the latter they consider themselves to have compatible
goals.
In an extra-deal renegotiation, the general tendency of the
party who feels it has been forced into renegotiation is to fight a
97. See, e.g., Roy LEWICKd ET AL., NEGOTIATION-READINGS, EXERCISES AND CASES
(1993); Terrence Hoppman, Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem Solv-
ing, 542 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 24-47 (1995);Jeswald W. Salacuse, Intercul-
tural Negotiation in International Business, 8 GROuP DECISION & NEG. 217, 225 (1999).
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rear guard action, to raise recriminations, to see the process as
the worst kind of win/lose activity in which anything gained by
the one side is an automatic loss to the other party. The chal-
lenge for both sides in a renegotiation is to create a win/win
process, an atmosphere of problem-solving, joint gains negotia-
tion. Even if a party feels forced into an extra-deal renegoti-
ation, it should approach the process as an opportunity to create
value, to make the pie bigger.98 Thus in the renegotiations be-
tween Enron and the Maharashtra state government over the
Dabhol Project, while Maharashtra State gained a reduced
power tariff and project that was no longer exclusively foreign,
Enron secured certain additional benefits including a large
power plant, increased capital from a new joint venture partner,
and an influential local partner who now had an interest in the
success of the project.
e. Make Sure the Parties Fully Understand the Alternatives to
Succeeding in the Renegotiation-Especially Their Costs
Negotiation scholars99 have identified the importance of
each side understanding its Best Alternative to a Negotiated
Agreement ("BATNA") and of estimating the other side's
BATNA. Recognizing the costs and benefits of a BATNA, for ex-
ample pursuing a claim in arbitration or being sued in a court,
may encourage both sides to work harder at resolving their
problems at the negotiating table. In the case of the Dabhol
Project, at the time the Maharashtra government cancelled the
Power Purchase Agreement, it probably assumed that its action
would entail relatively little cost. Moreover, it seemed to have
assumed that other investors would be willing to step into the
shoes vacated by Enron or that it would be able to find indige-
nous means of solving India's power shortage. When it fully un-
derstood that its alternatives to dealing with Enron were poten-
tially very costly, it looked more favorably on renegotiation than
it had at the time it cancelled the contract as a result to the Cabi-
net sub-committee's report. Once it fully understood the costs
that it might entail in an international commercial arbitration
and the difficulty it would encounter in attracting other inves-
98. See Howard Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlement, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 323-26 (Breslin & Rubin eds., 1991).
99. See Fisher, supra note 1.
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tors, it became considerably more open to agreeing to renegoti-
ation and to arriving at a satisfactory conclusion to the conflict.
f. Make Sure to Involve Either Directly or Indirectly All
Necessary Parties in the Renegotiation
In any renegotiation, a variety of parties may need to be in-
volved, either directly or indirectly, even though they are not
themselves insisting a renegotiation. It is therefore important to
determine who those parties are and how they should be con-
nected to the renegotiation process. For example, the Enron-
Maharashtra renegotiation, the Indian central government was
such a party since it had counter guaranteed the Maharashtra
government's payments under power purchase agreement and
would have to approve the terms of any renegotiated contract.
Whether such parties should be at the negotiating table is an-
other question. It may be preferable to conduct discussions with
them separately.
g. The Right Process for the Renegotiation is Important
It is important for both sides to think hard about the appro-
priate process for launching and conducting extra-deal renegoti-
ations. Renegotiations often emerge out of crisis characterized
by severe conflict among the parties, threats, and high emotion.
An appropriate process for the renegotiation may help to mollify
the parties and reduce the negative consequences of the crisis
on their subsequent discussions. An inappropriate process, on
the other hand, may serve to heighten those negative conse-
quences and impede the renegotiations. Thus in the case of the
Dabhol Project, the government of the State of Maharashtra,
having repudiated the original contract while declaring that re-
negotiations were out of the question, needed to find a process
later on that would allow renegotiations to take place while pre-
serving its dignity and prestige. The use of a committee of ex-
perts, rather than face-to-face renegotiations between the gov-
ernment and Enron to start the process, served this purpose.
The committee, in effect, conducted the renegotiations, which
the government had the discretion to approve or disapprove.
Moreover, its status as a committee of independent experts,
rather than of politicians, tended to give its recommendations a
legitimacy needed to persuade the public that Indian interests
had been protected.
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In some cases, the way in which a renegotiation is framed
may influence its success. For example, rather than use the label
"renegotiation," a term that conjures up negative implications of
fundamental changes in the sanctity of contract, the parties in
some cases can cast the renegotiation as an effort to clarify ambi-
guities in the existing agreement, rather than to change basic
principles. This approach, at least formally, respects the sanctity
of contract and thereby may avoid some of the friction and hos-
tility engendered by demanding outright extra-deal renegotia-
tions. For example, a host country government finding that a
foreign investment project exempted from "all taxes and duties"
is placing increasing demands on public services may seek to re-
quire the project to pay "user fees" for certain governmental ser-
vices on the grounds that they are not taxes or duties. Another
approach is to request "review" or "reinterpretation" of key
terms in the contract in light of changes in circumstances, while
still preserving the principles in the original agreement. For ex-
ample, even if the host government had specifically agreed that
the investment project would be exempt from user fees, requir-
ing it to pay additional costs incurred by the government to sup-
ply power to the project during an energy crisis might be a prin-
cipled way for redefining the scope of the exemption without
altering the fundamental principles agreed by the parties.
Waiver is yet another way of framing a renegotiation, an ap-
proach that respects the sanctity of the agreement yet enables
the burdened party to obtain the relief it seeks. For example,
during the energy crisis mentioned above, the government
might seek a temporary waiver of certain of its obligations until
the crisis ends.
h. Consider a Role For a Mediator in the
Renegotiation Process
Mediation is basically a "voluntary, non-binding process in
which a third person tries to help the parties reach a negotiated
settlement."'10 Although mediators are not used frequently in
resolving international business disputes, they may play a useful
100. SeeJAcoB BERCOVITCH &JEFFREY Z. RUBIN, MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS: MULTIPLE APPROACHES TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 7 (1992) (offering similar, but
more elaborate, definition of mediation); see also Direct Negotiation and Mediation, supra
note 16, at 53-72.
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role in assisting the parties to achieve agreement during a rene-
gotiation. A mediator can help in any or all of the following
three functions: (1) helping design and manage the renegoti-
ation process so that the parties will have the maximum opportu-
nities to create value through their interaction, (2) assisting with
the communications between the two sides in a way that will fa-
cilitate positive results from their renegotiation, and (3) sug-
gesting substantive solutions to the problems that the parties are
encountering during the course of their extra-deal renegoti-
ation.
CONCLUSION
Renegotiation, whether post-deal, intra-deal, or extra-deal,
is a constant fact of international business life. As a result, pro-
ject developers, financing institutions, and their lawyers need to
understand this phenomenon and devise strategies and mecha-
nisms to deal with it productively. For many persons, renegoti-
ation is an aberration; for others, a somewhat disreputable prac-
tice. It provokes images of disappointed expectations, of broken
promises, of bargains made but not kept. From the vantage
point of the individual project company facing demands for an
unwanted renegotiation, such a reaction is normal and under-
standable. But from the vantage of international business life in
general, renegotiation can be seen as playing a constructive role.
Sixty years ago, Karl Llewellyn made a thoughtful inquiry into
the role of contract in the social order and concluded: "One
turns from the contemplation of the work of contract as from
the experience of Greek tragedy. Life struggling against form,
.... -101 In the realm of modern project contracting, the strug-
gle of life against form continues. The case of the Dabhol Power
Project was essentially a struggle between the political life of In-
dia and the form of the Power Purchase Agreement. As that case
demonstrates, the role of renegotiation in the social order of
modern international business is to mediate the struggle be-
tween life and form, to allow life and form to adjust to one an-
other over the long term at the least cost.
101. See Llewellyn, supra note 29, at 751.
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